Using a common agency framework, we characterize possible equilibria when annuities contracts are not exclusive. We discuss theoretical and empirical implications of these equilibria. First, we show that at equilibrium prices are not linear. Then we characterize an equilibrium. We provide conditions for existence and show that this equilibrium is efficient.
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Introduction
To simplify the notation, we will use a short notation for the utility function
We consider markets, agents will be taken as "small" players. Hence they will play independently and they will not interact in any way. Our model can be interpreted as well as a model with a single agent.
Insurance companies are formalized as profit maximizing firms with the same constant return-to-scale production technology. Namely, an annuity contract (p, r) owns by agent having a probability π to live a long life, generates the profit:
We do not introduce any administrative cost. By doing this, we follow the RS's model and keep our results comparable to the RS's ones. Moreover, administrative costs do not seem to be important and cannot explain alone why annuity markets are empirically so small. Porteba (2001) give some econometric evidence showing that administrative costs can explain only a reduced share of annuities prices. 1 As we have said, we do not want to depart from traditional insurance model.
The main issue of the model is the adverse selection problem. Then, we introduced two kind of agents, differing by their probability to live longer. Some agents have a high life expectancy, their probability to live a long life is π 2 and some other have a lower life expectancy, i.e; they have a probability π 1 to live longer life (and by necessity π 2 > π 1 ).
The proportion of high and low life expectancy agents are respectively n 2 and n 1 , and n 1 + n 2 = n.
Probabilities π 2 and π 1 and proportion n 1 and n 2 are common knowledge. Agents know their life expectancy, insurance companies cannot distinguish between the two kind of agents and cannot offer contract contingent on the their life expectancy.
Insurance company cannot prevent agents to buy contracts from other companies.
In that sense contracts are incomplete. Hence we consider a model of non-exclusive contracts, or in the jargon of contract theory, a common agency game.
If agent are allowed to hold simultaneously several contracts, market are not anonymous. They cannot buy to contracts to the same company, and they cannot resell their contract to some other agent.
To make the problem tractable, we assume that the agents' preferences satisfy the "single crossing" condition. The restriction is critical and it is know that properties derived under this assumption are sometimes not robust. Formally: 
Graphically, in the space (r, p), if two indifference curves cross each others, they cross only once.
We can represent this property in the space (r, p). In the figure 1, two indifference curves intersect at the point C. The indifference curve of the high probability agents (denoted IC 2 ) has always a higher derivative than the indifference curve of the low probability agents (denoted IC 1 ). Hence they cannot intersect twice.
We follow the literature on common agency games and we consider that insurance companies (the principals) compete through "menus" (generically denoted M in the following.) In other words, we will consider that insurance companies offer a set of contract, and the agent is allow to choose one in each of these sets. Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002) have shown that there is no loss of generality by considering these kind of mechanisms. Hence our results do not rely on any ad hoc restriction on the offers that can be made by the insurers. 2 For obvious technical reasons, we will constrain these sets M to be compact and measurable.
To be precise we give the definition of a linear equilibrium.
Definition 1 We said that an equilibrium is linear if:
• The insurance companies offer the same menu,
• this menu is a line in the space (p, r).
In other words, an equilibrium is linear if the equilibrium price is linear.
Finally, two benchmarks are interesting to interpret our results. The first important benchmark, is the competitive equilibrium when the information is complete. We denote the equilibrium contracts C FB 1 and C FB 2 . The both type of agents receive a fair insurance contract with respect to their probability: C FB 1 belongs to the line L 1 , characterized by the equation p = π 1 r, the contract C FB 2 belong to L 2 , (equation p = π 2 r). They are fully insured. The equilibrium is efficient. 
Figure 3: The Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium We denote C RS 1 and C RS 2 the equilibrium contracts. The high probability agents receive their competitive outcome: C RS 2 = C FB 2 . Hence they fully insured. The low probability agents receive the contract c RS 1 which is defined has the intersection of the line L 1 and the indifference curve of the high probability agents passing through C FB 2 (here denoted IC 2 ). The low probability agent are not fully insured. The equilibrium exists if the proportion of high probability agents n 2 is large enough. This equilibrium (when it exists) is not efficient, even if we consider the constraints due to information. An imperfectly informed planner could improve the allocation.
Linear Prices
We consider a scenario in which n insurance companies (n > 1) interact by offering linear contracts. By linear contracts, we mean that they offer menus in which the premium p is proportional to the indemnity r, more precisely, menus M α that can be defined as
We will show that if n − 1 firms are offering the linear contract M α , the n th has no incentive to offer that contract. In order to do that, let us assume that at equilibrium each insurance company offers a contract such that the premium p is proportional to the indemnity r. In that case, agent with the probability of accident π, (with π ∈ {π 1 , π 2 }) who has chosen a contract (α r, r) gets the utility:
Let us remark that choosing a contract for an agent, is equivalent to choose a particular r. For the agent contracting with only one company or accepting several contract from different companies is equivalent.
Let us denote the contract chosen by the agent π:
If α ≤ π then r * (α, π) = l, and if
To simplify the notations, we define Π (α)
Lemma 1 Let us consider a linear symmetric equilibrium in which each company offer the menu of contract M α where α ∈ (0, π 2 ). Then it exists a contract (p,r) ∈ R 2 + such thatp/r < α and n 1p − n 1 π 1r + n 2p − n 2 π 2r > Π (α). 
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If the Menu M α is offered, low risk agent buy the contract C 1 and high risk agents buy the contract C 2 as indicated in the graph. It would be better or a principal to con-strain the high risk agents to buy the contract C 1 . This can be (almost) done if he offers the single contractC. The low risk agents prefer this new contract. The high agents to. They by it and they supplement it in order to get the contact C. IfC is close enough to C 1 , the deviation is profitable. This is formally stated in our first proposition.
Proposition 1 If the single crossing condition is satisfied, at equilibrium, insurance companies are offering linear contracts.
Let us interpret a little bit more this first proposition. It is show that if all other companies offer the same linear menu M α , the best reply of a company is to offer something else. But it has stronger implications. Imagine that the offers made by the (n − 1) companies lead to an aggregate menu equal to M α . This can happen if they are infinitely many companies that offer each a single contract which belongs to the line defined by p = αr. Then the best reply of the remain company is to offer a contract or a set of contract which is not in the line defined by p = αr.
Our result does not rely on the number of company n (as long as n > 1). Hence even if n is very large, in other words, even if the market is very competitive, we should not observe linear prices.
If the single crossing condition is not satisfied, it may exist a linear equilibrium. 3 Concerning our model, even if we do not have a formal proof, the existence of a linear equilibrium would be very surprising, locally the the same kind of argument can be applied.
Nonlinear Prices
In the previous section we have shown that at equilibrium menus are not linear. Hence it is legitimate to try to characterize nonlinear equilibria. One natural candidate for an equilibrium is the RS equilibrium. In fact it turns out that the RS equilibrium is not implement anymore if insurance companies cannot impose an exclusive relationship to the agent. 
Proposition 2
Figure 4: The Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is not robust
In the example presented in the graphic, if all other insurance companies offer the RS contracts, a insurance company can offer the contract C 3 . As shown in the graphic the contract C 3 generates positive profit if it bough by the high risk agents as it is above 14 the line L 2 . The graphic also shows that this contract is never bough alone by a high risk agent, it is above the curve IC 2 . But the high risk agents can buy the contract C 1 and the contract C 3 together, then they reach the pointC which is strictly preferred to the point
C RS
2 . Hence, the deviation is profitable for the deviating principal.
The RS equilibrium is not implementable because an insurance company can use the contract offered by its competitors as bases for its own offers. Roughly speaking an insurance company can ask to a high risk agent to misreport his type to an other company. He will enjoy a cheap contract, but with a low coverage. The deviating company then propose to him to supplement this contract with a small contract. The resulting contract, will remains relatively cheap, but with a acceptable coverage. Obviously, this deviation implies losses for the non-deviating companies.
Under non-exclusivity, insurance companies must prevent this kind of deviation, and hence they cannot propose anymore the RS contracts.
Let us consider the following contracts.
• First we define the contractC 1 = (p 1 ,r 1 ) as the contract that maximizes V (p 1 , r 1 , π 1 )
+ under the constraint p 1 = (n 1 π 1 + n 2 π 2 ) r 1 .
• Second we define the contractC 2 = (p 2 ,r 2 ) in the following way. The coverage r 2 is such that r 1 + r 2 = l andp2/r 2 = π 2 .
• Finally, we defineĈ = (p,r). The contractĈ is such that V (C 2 , π 2 ) = V (C 1 + C, π 2 ).
These contracts will be the contract offered at equilibrium, together with the linear menu (p, r) ∈ R 2 + |p = π 2 r . We need to define few more contracts, that are convenient to characterize our equilibrium but which are not offered at equilibrium.
• The contract C 1 = (p 1 , r 1 ) is defined in the following way. It is a contract that satisfied the three following conditions:
• The contract C 2 = (p 2 , r 2 ) is defined in a similar way. It is a contract that satisfied the three following conditions: 
The line L is the line having the equation p = (n 1 π 1 + n 2 π 2 ) r.
We need conditions to characterize our equilibrium.
Condition 1 The condition (E) is satisfied is and only if
These two conditions ensure that the high risk agents will prefer the contracts designed for them (the contractC 1 +C 2 ) rather than the contract than a contract that would result from the duplication of the other existing contracts. In figure 5 the condition 2Ĉ <C 1
is not satisfied while the other condition is.
Condition 2 The condition (E ′ ) is satisfied is and only if for all contracts C
These conditions are needed to be sure that if an insurance deviates from the contract C 1 and offer a contract C then the high risk agent will by it together with the contractĈ.
As we will see, it will make the deviation non profitable.
Proposition 3 If the condition (E) and (E ′ ) are satisfied: Hence the following menus constitute an equilibrium:
• n companies offer the menu C 1 S (p, r) ∈ R 2 + |p = π 2 r ,
• 2 companies offer the menu
The agents buy the contractC 2 if their type is π 2 and the contractC 1 when their type is π 1 .
Before to state the conditions under which the equilibrium exists, we will make few remarks.
At equilibrium the contractĈ is never bought, it is a "latent contract". 4 Even if this contract is not bought, it plays a crucial role. If it is not offered, a principal can profitably deviate by offering a contract close to C 1 bought by the low risk agents only. This deviation is not possible because the high risk would by this contract together with the contractĈ. Martimort and Stole (2002) analyse in detail the implications in term of direct mechanisms and menus. It is because we need "latent contracts" at equilibrium that we cannot restrict attention to direct mechanisms and that we should consider menus instead. The same remark applies for almost all contracts in the menu (p, r) ∈ R 2 + |p = π 2 r .
The high risk agents buy two contract. The equilibrium can obviously rewritten with a new contract C 2 =C 1 +C 2 . The important thing is that risk agents can buy the contracts C 1 andC 2 . In that interpretation of the equilibrium, we can emphasis that a kind of crosssubsidization occurs at equilibrium. The low risk agents buy the contractC 1 which is not actuarially fair given their probability π 1 . They buy a relatively expensive contract. On the other hand, the high risk agents buy a relatively cheap contract, C 2 orC 1 +C 2 . This contract is sustainable only because it is subsidized by the low risk agents. In the RS's model, the equilibrium contract are acturially fair and any kind of cross-subsidization can be sustained at equilibrium.
Insurance companies do not make profit at equilibrium. It is a surprising result compared to one obtained by Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) . As we have said, the main difference between our model and their, is that we consider adverse selection and their consider moral hazard. Contrary to us, they found positive profit equilibria (for some values of their parameters). These positive profit equilibria are very strong, they are robust to free entry. 5
The intuition behind these very different results could be that in moral hazard model a little change in the offers may induce very different behaviors. Agent who was making efforts may stop suddenly. Hence in a moral hazard setting the Bertrand's argument does not apply because a aggressive offer may change the agent's behavior.
Here, agent takes no decisions, except to buy or not contracts. Hence an insurance company can make aggressive offers provided that its offer remains incentive compatible. It turns out that the only aggressive offers that an insurance can make are the ones bought by all the agents. Hence at equilibrium insurances propose a contract that is bought by all agent and leads to zero profits. 5 Positive profit equilibria seems to be a common feature of common agency modal of moral hazard. Parlour and Rajan (2001) in a model of strategic default show that at equilibrium profits may be strictly positive.
This interpretation should be taken carefully. Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000) proposed a model close to our and characterize positive profit equilibria. Their model is not a real model of insurance and it is interpreted as a model of finance. Nevertheless the reason why their results are different from ours remains unclear. An explanation could be that they consider a continuum of type and we consider only two types of agents. In any case their model and our are quite different and cannot be compared directly.
At equilibrium, high risk agents are fully insured, low risk agent are only partially covered. It justify the approach taken in applied papers. It is not a surprising result. Our model can be interpreted as the RS's model plus some extra constraints. Hence, it is natural to find that it exhibits the RS's equilibrium main property.
Finally, the number of firms do not affect the equilibrium (as long as n ≥ 1). Hence even if n becomes very large, the equilibrium does not converge toward a linear equilibrium. Hence our model does not provide any foundation for a general equilibrium approach of incomplete information models. 6
Proposition 4 If π 1 and π 2 are closed enough and is n 1 is small enough, the equilibrium characterized in proposition 3 exists.
The existence conditions are different from RS. They need a sufficiently high proportion of high risk agents. We require exactly the reverse, a sufficiently high proportion of low risk agents. Moreover they do not need any assumption one the probabilities π 1 and π 2 . We need the restrictive condition π 1 and π 2 not to much different.
Hence the RS equilibrium and our equilibrium cannot be compared straightforwardly. They are likely to exist for different values of the parameters.
Nevertheless, we can state a last important property of our equilibrium.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium characterized in proposition 3 sustains an optimal allocation.
The equilibrium allocation is different from the full information equilibrium described in figure 2. As the utilities are not transferable, the optimal quantities are not unique. Hence we can have two different allocations that are both optimal.
The equilibrium allocation is also first best optimal. We mean that it would be an optimal allocation in a full information economy. At a first glance it sounds very surprising. It is not. The information structure, here the fact that agents know their probability of survival, constrains the set of optimal allocation. In other words some optimal are not implementable because of information issues. For example, it is clear the full information competitive equilibrium allocation is not sustainable anymore under asymmetric information. If some optimal allocations are not implementable anymore, some remain implementable, as it is the case for our equilibrium allocation. In general, optimal allocations that give a lot of surplus to the high risk agents are likely to be implementable under asymmetric information. As they enjoy an high level of welfare, high risk agents have no reason to adopt a strategic behavior.
Our interpretation of this result is the following. First, let us remark that at equilibrium the risk agents are not indifferent between their contractC 1 +C 2 and the contract designed for the low risk agents,C 1 . High risk agent preferC 1 +C 2 thanC 1 and low risk agent preferC 1 thanC 1 +C 2 . High risk agents have many way to cheat on the insurance companies. They can choose one type contract from one company an another type of contract from another company. In the RS's model they can only choose the contract designed for the low risk agents. As they have many way to misbehave, insurance companies must let top them a lot of surplus. As they get a lot of surplus at equilibrium they do not have reason to misbehave, i.e; to choose contracts not designed for them. It follows that at equilibrium information is not an issue, and hence market forces lead to an optimal allocation.
There is no standard results concerning optimality in common agency games. Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) show that equilibria characterized in their moral hazard setting are not efficient. In the other hand, Attar, Campioni, and Piaser (2006) show that the equilibria of Parlour and Rajan's (2001) common agency model are efficient. In the same manner the equilibrium characterized in Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000) is not efficient.
To conclude our remarks about optimality, we would emphasis that if the equilibrium is efficient, it may remain issues about redistribution. For example compared to RS allocation, high risk agents prefer the non-exclusive equilibrium, but the low risk agents prefer the RS equilibrium, and insurance companies are indifferent. 7 Then, even if it is not efficient, the RS equilibrium may be preferred to the non-exclusive outcome for redistribution motives.
Conclusion
The literature on annuity markets focuses on equilibria in which prices are linear. In this note, we have shown that there is no clear game theoretic foundations for that approach. More precisely, in a context of adverse selection, if insurance companies compete through nonlinear prices, there is no equilibrium with linear price or converging toward linear prices, even if the number of companies is very large.
As it appears that empirically prices seems to be linear, (see for example Finkelstein and Porteba (2004) ), we could conclude that adverse selection may not be relevant phenomenon in annuity markets. It does not means that adverse selection is totally absent, but other imperfections or features should be at work. Mainly we see two potential lines of research:
Moral hazard may be a relevant aspect of annuity markets. Agents may have influence on their expected lite time. If an agent knows that it will receive a decent pension in his old days, he may change if behavior (alcohol, cigarettes) to enjoy a longer life. This is a potentially important aspect of annuity markets which has not been fully explored yet.
The positive correlation between life time and annuity could be explained by different in wealth rather than by adverse selection effect as claimed by Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) . The potential importance of wealth distribution in retirement assets management has been studied, 8 but its policy implications are not been intensively studied. Dushi and Webb (2004) 's findings suggest that wealth distribution is very important factor that cannot be neglected.
First, if the contract C is bought by the π 2 -type agents only, it cannot be profitable. They buy the contractsC 1 andC 2 , and those contracts would induces losses it they were bought by π 2 -type agents only. Hence, all contracts that are preferred toC 1 +C 2 by the π 2 -type agents induce loss for the insurance companies.
We assume that the contract C is bought by all agents. In order to be bought by the π 1 -type agents, the contract C must be below the line define by the equation p = (n 1 π 1 + n 2 π 2 ) r. Hence, to be profitable, it must be bought be the π 1 -type agents only.
To be bought by the π 1 -type agents only, the contract C must belong to the set Zdefined in the following way:
This set has a simple graphical representation. We denoteĨ C 1 the indifference of the π 1 -type agents passing through the contractC 1 , and We denoteĨ C 2 the indifference of the π 2 -type agents passing through the contractC 2 . We denote by C * their intersection.
Under the basic assumption of our model, this intersection exists. Unambiguously we can write C * >C 1 , as the curveĨ C 2 is tangent to a line passing through the pointC 1 , the curveĨ C 1 andĨ C 2 intersect at the right ofC 1 . Moreover under the condition (E) we have C 1 < C 2 . The set Z can be seen as the curviline triangle C * C 1 C 2 .
Let us remark that under our assumptions, the set Z is nonempty.
Let us consider the contracts (p, r) of Z such that V ((p, r) , π 1 ) = V C 1 , π 1 and r ≤r 1 . It is a segment of the curveĨ C 1 , that we denoteS 1 .
The translation with respect to the vectorĈ is denoted TĈ. We denote IC 1 the translate ofĨ C 1 by the translation TĈ. The translate of the segmentS 1 by the translation TĈ is the segment overlineS 1 , fromC 1 +Ĉ 1 toČ 1 . We have assumed that C 2 <Č 1 .
Under our assumptions (condition (E ′ ), the curveĨ C 2 and the segmentS 1 cannot intersect two times.
From that discussion it comes that every point of the segment S 1 is preferred to the pointC 1 +C 2 by the π 2 -type agents. Now we consider the set of contract (p, r) such that:
p ≥ π 1 r, V ((p, r) , π 1 ) ≥ V C 1 , π 1 , V ((p, r) , π 2 ) = V C 2 , π 2 , p ≤p 1 .
(12)
It is easy to check that this set (denoteS 2 ) is nonempty. Using simple arguments, it can be shown that if the contract C belongs toS 2 , then V C +Ĉ, π 2 ≥ V C 1 +C 2 , π 2 .
We define the setZ as
Hence we can state that if the contract C belongs to the setZ, then
We define the setŽ as
If the contract C belongs to the setZ, then by construction it exists an α > 0 "small enough" such that V C + αC 2 , π 2 ≥ V C 1 +C 2 , π 2 .
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To conclude, deviating toward a single contract C is never profitable for a principal.
D.2 Two contracts menus
Let us assume that a principal deviates by offering a menu {C 1 ,C 1 +C 2 }. To be profitable, the preceding offer must be such that
It implies that the contract C 1 is below the line L. Moreover, the contract C 2 must be the line L 2 . It implies that the offer {C 1 ,C 1 +C 2 } cannot be profitable.
Any deviation involving two contracts that can be written as a menu {C 1 ,C 1 +C 2 } are not profitable. Using the same kind or argument, one can see that there is no profitable deviation by using menus of two contracts.
D.3 General Menus
Let us consider a menu M (compact subset of R 2 + ). As agent are "small", the do not interact (the game is similar to a game with one agent only), we can neglect mixed strategies. We assume that π 1 -type agents choose the contract C 1 and the π 2 -type agents choose the contract C 2 . Hence rather than offer the menu M, the deviating principal could equivalently offer the menu {C 1 ,C 2 }. As we have seen, these deviations are not profitable.
E Proof of Proposition 4
First let us imagine that n = n 1 and π 1 < π 2 . Using continuity, we can state that that if π 1 are π 2 closed enough,Ĉ is as small as we want. Moreover if n = n 1 , thenC 1 = C 1 anď C 1 =Ĉ +C 1 . Hence by construction we have C 1 < C 2 <Č 1 . Hence conditions (E) and (E ′ ) are satisfied. Apply a simple argument of continuity, we can argue that it remains true if n 1 close enough to n.
F Proof of Proposition 5
If one want to increase π 2 -type agents utility, it can only be done by decreasing the profit of the insurance company. This due to the indifference curve passing throughC 2 +C 1 has derivative equal to π 2 at the pointC 2 +C 1 .
In order to get positive or zero profits, insurance companies must charge the π 1 -type agents, which decrease their utility.
The same argument applies to every other players (companies and π 1 -type agents).
